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ENUMERATED LIMITS, NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES, AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSTEPPING: WHY THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROVISION OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to
the rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself.1
Needing an effective national government but fearing a
tyrannical central power, the Framers invented their own unique
governmental model. The Framers designed a democratic system
that balanced authority between the state and federal governments.
The Framers created this federalist form of government to protect
the liberties of the people, who, after all, are "the only proper
objects of government."2 The Framers chiefly worried about either
the states or the federal government having too much power
because such an imbalance would threaten the "double security"
needed to protect "the rights of the people."3 Hence, the Framers
specifically delegated only limited powers to the federal government
while reserving those powers not delegated "to the States respectively, or to the people."' Although the federal-state balance of
power has changed significantly since the adoption of the Constitution, the question as to the appropriate scope of federal-state power
is still one of the most important issues in constitutional law.
The nature of the federal-state relationship today differs
greatly from what it was at the time of ratification. The adoption
of the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments has had a
monumental impact on the division of power between the states and
the federal government.5 Moreover, the adoption and subsequent
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 357.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X.

5. For recent pieces exploring the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification
of federalism as a limit on federal governmental power, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 17-23, 160-85 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale L. J. 2279, 2301-11
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judicial ratification of the New Deal has changed forever this

federal-state balance; the monstrous regulatory federal government
that exists today is altogether a different species than the one contemplated by the Framers." Despite these significant changes, and

a once-deferential judiciary, federalism still provides a meaningful
checkt on an overpowering federal government. A majority of the
Supreme Court has emphasized this fact time and again during its
recent neo-federalism movement, which began with its decision
New York v. United States,' continued through United States v.
Lopez,8 Printz v. United States,9 and City of Bourne v. Flores,' and
came to a head with its recent decisions inAlden v. Maine," Florida
PrepaidPostsecondaryEducationExpense Boardv. College Savings
Bank (College Savings Board 1),2 FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank (College Savings

BoardII), 3 and Kimel v. FloridaBoardof Regents. 14 United States

(1999) [hereinafter Ackerman, Revolution]. But cf David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence
Thomas and the Supreme Court'sRediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U.- L. REV.
339, 367-69 (1996) (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment had little or no effect on the
Tenth Amendments federalist limitations on the federal government). For recent pieces
exploring the impact of ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment on federal-state relations,
see Vikram David Amar, IndirectEffects ofDirectElection: A StructuralExaminationofthe
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1347 (1996); Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of
ConstitutionalDemocracy: Federalism,the Supreme Court,andthe SeventeenthAmendment,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671 (1999). See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk
of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current
Reform Proposals,45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165 (1997) (providing a comprehensive historical and
structural account of the purposes, causes, and effects of the Seventeenth Amendment by
utilizing a public choice analysis).
6. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supranote 5, at 23-26,255-311; Ackerman,
Revolution, supra note 5, at 2312-36.
7. 505 U.S. 144, 155-60 (1992).
8. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court altered the last sixty years of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence by declaring that Congress did not have the Constitutional
authority to pass the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) because of the federalist structure
of the Constitution. See id. at 567-68.
9. 521 U.S. 898, 925-29 (1997) (holding that Congress did not have the power to
commandeer states into enforcing provisions of the Brady Act because such commandeering
is inconsistent with the federalist structure of the Constitution).
10. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress did not have the constitutional
authority to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) because Congress's power
to regulate the states in areas such as religious liberty is limited by the federalist structure
ofthe Constitution, despite the apparently broad authority given to Congress in Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
11. 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247-54 (1999).
12. 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2223-24 (1999).
13. 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2204-05 (1999).
14. 120 S. Ct. 631, 643-45 (2000).
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v. Morrison,'5 a case currently on the Supreme Court's docket,
promises to be the capstone of this movement.
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court has the
opportunity to announce finally that this neo-federalism movement
is not aberrational, and that the Court is serious about scaling back
the deference it previously has given to Congress's use of its
enumerated powers. This Note examines United States v. Morrison
and the lower court's opinions in Brzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnic
6 and concludes that the Supreme
Institute and State University"
Court should hold that Congress did not have the constitutional
authority to enact the Civil Rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA)."7
To reach such a conclusion," this Note takes both a descriptive
and normative look at Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 This Note
16. 120 S. Ct. 11 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5, 99-29).
16. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), affg 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), affg 935 F.
Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
17. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). For a more in depth discussion of VAWA
and where it is codified, see supra note 30.
18. Legal commentators and the media have watched the Brzonkalacase closely from the
very outset. Indeed, the case has attracted the attention of some of the nation's largest newspapers. See, e.g., Court Voids Civil Rights Law on Rape Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999,
at A9; Court Voids U.S. Law on Rape Victim Suits, Cm!. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1999, at 4; Brooke A.
Masters,Appeals CourtRejects PartofGender-ViolenceAct, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,1999, at Al.
The Brzonkala case has attracted a large amount of attention because the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari, see supra note 15, and because of the enormous impact that the
Court's decision in Morrison will have on constitutional law. If the Supreme Court affirms
the en bane opinion, that decision may put teeth into many of the Court's recent decisions
which have placed new limits on congressional power to regulate areas that have been traditionally relegated to the states. Moreover, VAWA and its apparent intrusion into areas traditionally relegated to the states has prompted even the generally reserved Chief Justice to
express concern that the civil rights prevision ofVAWA has the "potential to create needless
friction and duplication among the state and federal systems," William H. Rehnquist,
Welcoming Remarks: NationalConference on State-FederalJudicialRelationships, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1992), and that the civil rights provision of VAWA creates a"new private
right of action so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes." CH. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 2, 1992, at 2, 4 (quoting from
Chief Justice Rehnquist's 1991 REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY). The Chief Justice's
comments, the media attention, and the fact that over twenty organizations filed Amici
Curiae briefs in the Morrison case, see Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 11, all suggest that the
constitutionality of the civil rights provision of VAWA is a timely and important topic.
19. A descriptive analysis of the law focuses on what the current state of the law is and
tries to apply this current state of the law to a new set of facts. See Timothy P. Terrell,
Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development of
FundamentalNormative Principles,72 CAL. L. REV. 288, 295 (1984). A normative analysis
of the law, in contrast, focuses on what the law ought to be. See id. at 305. Therefore, this
Note's descriptive analysis will apply what the current law is with respect to VAWA in order
to determine whether VAWAis a constitutional exercise ofcongressional power. This Note's
normative analysis, on the other hand, will argue that, notwithstanding the current law,
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argues on a descriptive level that, under recent Supreme Court
precedent, Congress lacks the power to enact the civil rights
provision of VAWA under either the Commerce Clause or Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2" Additionally, this Note argues
on a normative level that Congress should not have the constitutional authority to legislate in areas such as intrastate crime and
domestic relations. Placing such broad authority in the hands of a
centralized body calls into question the very system of government
that the Framers carefully designed and threatens the liberties and
efficiencies that a federalist system secures.
The first part of this Note discusses the adoption and structure
of VAWA. The second part examines United States v. Morrisonby
laying out the facts, the procedural history, and the reasoning used
by the lower courts, including the district court,2 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel,22 and the en banc Fourth Circuit Court of
VAWA ought to be an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power because legislation
like VAWA eviscerates many of the benefits secured by a federalist structure of government.
For insightful commentaries on the normative/descriptive or is/ought distinction, see, for
example, Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politicsof Form, 139 U. PA. L REV. 801,808-14
(1991); James Donato, Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation,40 STAN. L.
REV. 1517, 1519 (1988); C. Emerson Talmage, Comment, Do Survival Values Form a
Sufficient Basis for an Objective Morality?: A Realist's Appraisal of the Rules of Human
Conduct, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 893, 909 (1994).
This Note makes the normative arguments that follow, in part, because they are
more likely to be persuasive to courts. Indeed, the en banc Fourth Circuit seemed persuaded
more by the normative principles underlying a holding that Congress overstepped its
constitutional powers than it was persuaded by a descriptive argument that a given case was
dispositive. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826. Moreover, Richard A. Posner, the Chief Judge
on the Seventh Circuit, recognized that normative arguments are important precisely
because they are more likely to be persuasive to an appeals court:
The second biggest mistake that... advocates make... is to think that they
can win by rubbing the judges' noses in the precedents. In an argued civil case,
...there probably is no dispositive precedent-otherwise the case would
probably not have gotten to the point of an orally argued appeal. And if there
is no dispositive precedent, then unless the aplellate judges are very gullible,
it is futile to argue the case as if there were....
The most effective method of arguing such a case is to identify the
[normative] purpose behind the relevant legal principle and then show how that
purpose would be furthered by a decision in favor of the advocate's position.
Richard A. Posner, Convincing a Federal Court ofAppeals, LITIGATION, Winter 1999, at 3,
4.
20. This Note examines both Congress's commerce power, see infra notes 102-94 and
accompanying text, and Congress's enforcement power, see infra notes, 198-267 and
accompanying text, in the third part of this Note.
21. The district court actually wrote its opinion inBrzonkalain two parts, and the Fourth
Circuit later joined the appeals. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935
F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996) (dealing with the Title IX hostile environment claims);
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding
VAWA unconstitutional).
22. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Appeals.23 The third part analyzes congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the fourth part, this Note argues on a normative level that Congress
should not have the power to enact legislation, such as VAWA, that
upsets the balanced sovereignty necessary to prevent tyranny. This
Note concludes that VAWA is a very important piece of legislation,
but Congress simply does not and should not have the authority to
enact it in the enumerated scheme created by the Constitution
despite its necessity.
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
Without question, violence against women is a horrible problem

in the United States. The statistics concerning violent acts
committed against women are overwhelming. 2' For example,
"[elvery week, during 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped,

and more than 90 women were murdered 9 out [of 10 [times] by
men."25 Additionally, even when women are home, they "are six
times more likely than men to be the victim of a violent crime
committed by an intimate [and] estimates indicate that more than
one of every six sexual assaults a week is committed by a family
member."2" If these statistics are not staggering enough, consider
also that "[t]hree out of four [U.S.] women will be the victim of a
violent crime sometime during their life,"27 and "[v]iolence is the
leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common
than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths
combined."28 To compound this egregious situation, "[olur laws,
policies, and attitudes remain inadequate in the face of the

23. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999)
(No. 99-5, 99-29).
24. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993). "In 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes were
reported to the police every week; at least 1.1 million reported assaults-including
aggravated assaults, rapes, and murders-were committed against women in their homes
that year, unreported domestic crimes have been estimated to be more than three times this
total." Id. (citing STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., VIOLENCE
AGAiNST WOMEN: A WEEK INTHE LIFE OF AMERICA 4 (1992)).
25. Id. at 38; see also Margo L. Ely, Civil Rights Law Withstands Early Constitutional
Test, CH. DAILY L. BULL, Feb. 9, 1998, at 6 (commenting on violence against women).
26. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 3S.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Surgeon General Antonio Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public
Health Services: A MedicalResponse to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992)).
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epidemic of violence against women. " ' 9 Obviously, action needed to
be taken to curb this alarming problem.
Congress responded to this problem by passing VAWA,30 which

was designed to control "the escalating problem of violent crime
against women."3 1 Although there are many important provisions
of VAWA, 2 the civil rights provision is the only part of VAWA that
raises any serious constitutional concern.3 3 Accordingly, this Note
focuses only on VAWA's civil rights provision.'
29. Id.
30. VAWA is actually part of the larger Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31 and
42 U.S.C.); see also Cass Sunstein et al., The Constitutionalityofthe ViolenceAgainst Women
Act, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW & LITIGATiON § 6.1 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1998)
(describing the Violence Against Women Act in general terms).
31. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37.
32. VAWA provided federal funding for educational and training programs to educate
state and federal judges and law enforcement officers about domestic violence and other
violence against women. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991-13992 (1994) (providing funding for training
programs for state courts); see id. §§ 14001-14002 (providing funding for federal courts); see
also Sunstein et al., supra note 30, § 6.3 (describing the federal expenditures made in
VAWA). VAWA also issued grants to state and local governments to combat violent crimes
against women, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg to 3796gg-5, 3797 (1994), and to provide education
for and prevention of sexual assaults. See id. § 13931, 16 U.S.C. §§ la-7a, 4601-8 (1994).
Additionally, VAWA amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to protect victims of crimes of
violence motivated by gender. See FED. KL EvID. 412 (codifying VAWA § 40141, 28 U.S.C. §
2074 (1994)). Another part of VAWA made it a federal crime for an individual to cross state
lines and cause physical injury to her spouse or partner "with the intent to injure, harass,
or intimidate" her spouse or partner. See VAWA § 40221 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)
(1994)). VAWA also makes it a federal crime to violate a protective order in any state other
than the one where the protective order was issued. See id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2262
(1994)). VAWA also extends full faith and credit to any protective order issued in any state.
See id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994)). Finally, VAWA amends the Immigration and
Nationality Act, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994), by reducing the burden on battered
immigrant women in achieving legal permanent resident status and by creating a selfpetitioning process. See VAWA §§ 40701-40703 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(aXl),
1186a(c)(4), 1254(a) (1994)).
33. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (holding that VAWA exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d. 452 (D.R.I. 1999)
(rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to VAWA's civil rights provision); Anisimov v. Lake,
982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. il. 1997) (holding that civil rights provision of VAWA did not exceed
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188
(E.D. Tenn. 1997) (doubting the policy arguments for VAWA but ultimately holding that
Congress had authority to pass the legislation); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (holding that Congress did not exceed its power by passing VAWA), rev'd on other
grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding
that VAWA does not exceed Congress's power under either the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment); Sunstein et al., supranote 30, § 6.1 (concluding that only the civil
rights provision of VAWA, also known as Title III, raises "serious legal question[sl]).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 13931 (1994). The civil rights provision of VAWA provides a private
cause of action to sue an individual for a violation of her "right to be free from crimes
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To establish a prima facie case under VAWA's civil rights
provision, a litigant must prove three things. First, a litigant must
prove the predicate offense of a violent crime or otherwise felonious
conduct.' VAWA expressly allows a civil rights action only for a
victim of a "crime of violence.' VAWA defines a crime of violence
as "anact or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the
conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another."'
Courts have held that any act that would constitute a felony under
either state or federal law is enough to satisfy the underlying crime
of violence requirement. 8 Additionally, state and federal statutes
can be interpreted jointly when determining felonious conduct. 9
Therefore, conduct that is punishable by imprisonment for more
than a year under a federal statute is a felony even if the same
conduct would be a misdemeanor under the relevant state statute.40
Further, a party can be civilly liable under VAWA even though the
party was never subject to criminal charges, so long as the plaintiff
in a VAWA cause of action can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the party committed a "crime of violence." 1
Second, to establish a prima facie case under VAWA's civil
rights provision, a plaintiff must prove that she was a victim of a
crime of violence that was "committed because of gender or on the
basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the
victim's gender. 4 2 The drafters of the statute specifically tailored
VAWA to apply only to crimes of violence motivated by gender
animus and not to "random acts of violence unrelated to gender.'
A plaintiff proceeding under VAWA must prove "subjectively] ...
on a case by case basis that the defendant was motivated by a bias
motivated by gender.' Id
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
36. Id
37. Id. § 13981(dX2XA).
38. See Hartz,970 F. Supp. at 1397 (holding that any violent felony under state or federal
law satisfies the crime of violence requirement); Crisonino v. New York City Housing Auth.,
985 F. Supp. 385,392 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same). For an excellent and detailed analysis of
the crime of violence requirement of VAWA, see David Frazee, Crime of Violence
Requirement, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW & LITIGATION, supra note 30, §§ 9:1-9:10.
39. See Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1399.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (1994) (classifying an offense with a maximum prison term
of five years and a minimum term of one year as a Class E felony).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(2) (1994) ('Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal
complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under
subsection (c) of this section.')
42. Id. § 13981(dXl).
43. Id § 13981(eXl).
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against the victim's gender.'
The standard for proving gender
motivation under VAWA is based upon the standard for proving
conduct motivated by gender under Title VII of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act:" look at the totality of circumstances for a determination of whether the conduct was gender motivated.'
The third element in a plaintiffs prima facie case under

VAWA's civil rights provision is the remedy. A plaintiffsuing under
VAWA is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages if she can
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was subject to
a crime of violence motivated by gender animus. 4' A plaintiff can

also sue for injunctive or declaratory relief." In addition, because
VAWA is a civil rights statute, a prevailing party under VAWA is

entitled to recover reasonable costs of litigation and attorneys fees
under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976."'
As the discussion above indicates, Congress designed VAWA
to work like other civil rights statutes. 5° Unlike other civil rights
statutes, however, it is unclear whether VAWA is an appropriate

constitutional extension of Congress's authority under either the
44. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1406 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49-50 (1993)); see also S.
REP. No. 103-138, at 49-50 (The committee is not asserting that all crimes against women
are gender-motivated. As discussed below, title III requires subjective proof on a case-bycase basis that the criminal was motivated by bias against the victim's gender.")
45. See Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1405; see also David Frazee, Gender Motivation
Requirement, in VIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMEN: LAW& LrIGATION, supra note 30, §§ 10:1-10:29
(analyzing the gender motivation requirement of VAWA). David Frazee explains how courts
and litigants should use Title VII standards:
To determine whether the "requisite discrimination" is present in VAWA cases,
courts will need to follow Title VII sexual harassment and employment
discrimination case law. One Title VII model of proof, however, is
inappropriate for the VAWA the disparate impact framework. Because of the
"any part" animus standard, mere statistical impact alone cannot suffice to
establish gender motivation under the VAWA, though it may provide
persuasive circumstantial evidence. The VAWA only covers what under Title
VII would be termed "intentional discrimination."... Since the circumstances
of violent felonies vary widely, courts must anticipate that plaintiffs will
attempt to prove gender motivation in a wide variety of ways. Proofof gender
motivation is inherently difficult. Especially in early litigation, courts should
permit great leeway to attorneys.
Id. § 10.1.
46. See Crisonino v. New York City Housing Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55; see also Frazee, supra note 45, § 10.1 (stating that "the
bottom line [standard) is the same for VAWA cases as it is for Title VII ... cases.")
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
48. See id.
49. See id. § 1988(b) (1994).
50. See, e.g., id. §§ 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985(c) (1999); Title VII ofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2 (1999); see also supranotes 45-46 and accompanying text (demonstrating
that VAWA's standards of proof are patterned after previous civil rights statutes).

20001

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT

455

Commerce Clause or the Enforcement Clause51 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The first court to seriously question Congress's
authority to pass VAWA was the federal district court in the
Western District of Virginia.5'
BRZONKALA
Facts

On the night of September 21, 1994, Christy Brzonkala and a
friend met two Virginia Tech football players, Antonio Morrison and
James Crawford.'
Brzonkala later alleged that about thirty
minutes after they met, Morrison and Crawford violently gang
raped her." Afraid and embarrassed, Brzonkala never reported
this rape to the police.55 Brzonkala was so traumatized that she
changed her appearance, cut off all her hair, attempted suicide, and
eventually dropped out of her classes." Seven months later,
Brzonkala finally reported the rape to Virginia Tech under its
Sexual Assault Policy.57
In May 1995, Virginia Tech held a hearing on the matter."
After the hearing, the committee acquitted Crawford because of
insufficient evidence.59 The committee nevertheless found Morrison
guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for a year.' Morrison
appealed, and Virginia Tech held another hearing on the matter
because it had mistakenly charged Morrison under the wrong policy
during the first hearing."1 The second hearing, however, "turned
51. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5.

52. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996).
53. See id. at 781-82.
54. See id
55. See id. at 782.
56. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir.
1997).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 954.
59. See id. ("The Virginia Tech judicial committee found insufficient evidence to take
action against Crawford .....
60. See id.
61. See i& at 954-55. Virginia Tech actually held the second hearing because it thought
that the procedural infirmities of the first hearing-that Morrison and Crawford were
charged under a sexual assault policy that did not come into existence until after the incident
happened-would make Morrison's sentence void and subject the school to liability on due
process and "ex post facto" grounds. See id. at 955. The Dean of Students at Virginia Tech
and another school official actually drove up to Bi-zonkala's home in Northern Virginia to
arrange a second hearing on the matter because of this perceived liability which had no basis
in the current law. See id.
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out to be much more than a mere formality."" The second committee only found Morrison guilty only of "abusive conduct" because
Morrison was charged only under the Abusive Conduct Policy at the
second-hearing but the committee still suspended him for a year.'
Morrison appealed this sentence to the Provost of the University, arguing that the hearing violated his due process rights and
that the sanction imposed was arbitrary and overly harsh." The
Provost overturned Morrison's sentence, finding that the immediate
suspension of Morrison for one year was "excessive when compared
with other cases where there has been a violation of the Abusive
Conduct Policy."' Instead, the Provost deferred the suspension
until Morrison graduated."
ProceduralHistory
Brzonkala brought suit against Morrison, Crawford, and
Virginia Tech alleging that the University violated Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972"7 in its handling of her
complaints." Additionally, Brzonkala sued Morrison and Crawford
62. Id. at 954. Judge Motz, the author of the majority opinion for the Fourth Circuit
panel, explained why the hearing was more than just a mere formality:
The second hearing lasted seven hours, more than twice as long as the first
hearing. Brzonkala was required to engage her own legal counsel at her own
expense. Moreover, the university belatedly informed her that student
testimony given at the first hearing would not be admissible at the second
hearing and that if she wanted the second judicial committee to consider this
testimony, she would have to submit affidavits or produce the witnesses.
Because she received insufficient notice, it was impossible for Brzonkala to
obtain the necessary affidavits or live testimony from her student witnesses.
In contrast, the school provided Morrison with advance notice so that he had
ample time to procure the sworn affidavits or live testimony of his student
witnesses. Virginia Tech exacerbated this problem by refusing Brzonkala or
her attorney access to the tape recordings of the first hearing, while granting
Morrison and his attorney complete and early access to those tapes. Finally,
Virginia Tech officials prevented Brzonkala from mentioning Crawford in her
testimony because charges against him had been dismissed; as a result she had
to present a truncated and unnatural version of the facts.
I& at 954-55.
63. See id. at 955.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. (noting that Morrison was ordered to attend a one-hour session with the
school's Equal Opportunity/Alcohol Awareness Compliance Officer to be tutored in
acceptable standards under University Student Policy).
67. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). The Title IX portions of Brzonkala's case are beyond
the scope of this Note. For a discussion of her Title IX claim, see Bronkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
68. See Brzonhaz, 935 F. Supp. at 776.
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under VAWA6 9 alleging that she was brutally gang raped because

of gender animus." The district court dismissed the VAWA claims
against Morrison and Crawford, finding VAWA unconstitutional
because Congress lacked the power under either the Commerce

72
Clause71 or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact it.
Brzonkala appealed this decision to a panel of the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals. 7' The panel, by a 2-1 vote, reversed the

district court and found that Congress did have the power to enact
VAWA under the Commerce Clause. 74 This panel reasoned that
United States v. Lopez 75 requires Congress to demonstrate through

its findings that the regulated activity-violence against
women-has a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. 6 The
panel argued that Congress's insertion of voluminous findings into
the record 77 indicated that Congress concluded that violence against
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). Brzonkala also brought state tort law claims against
Morrison and Crawford, but these claims are similarly beyond the scope of this Note. See
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 800 (dismissing state claims without prejudice).
70. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.

71. See id. at 793.
72. See id. at 800-01 (noting that violent acts against women by individuals did not create
a state interference with a citizen's right to equal protection).
73. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
74. See id. at 967-68 (holding that Congress simply demonstrated through its findings
that it had "a rational basis' for concluding that the regulated activity-here violence against
women--substantially 'affected interstate commerce'" (quoting UnitedStates v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995))).
75. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
76. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 965-66.
77. In this case, Congress spent four years making copious and extensive findings as to
the relationship between rape and interstate commerce. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38
(1993); H. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 33 (1990). Congress found
that:
(1) crimes motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes in violation
of the victim's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender;
(2) current law'provides a civil rights remedy for gender crimes committed in
the workplace, but not for gender crimes committed on the street or in the
home;
(3) State and Federal criminal laws do not adequately protect against the bias
element ofgender-motivated crimes, which separates these crimes from acts of
random violence, nor do those laws adequately provide victims of gendermotivated crimes the opportunity to vindicate their interests;
(4) existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often
deprives victims of gender-motivated crimes of equal protection of the laws and
the redress to which they are entitled;
(5) gender-motivated violence has a substantial adverse effect upon interstate
commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce;
(6) gender-motivated violence has a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
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women had a substantial effect upon interstate commerce; 78 thereby
satisfying the requirements under Lopez.7' Because the panel found
that Congress had the authority to enact VAWA under the
Commerce Clause, it never reached the Fourteenth Amendment
issuerS°
After rehearing the case en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the panel."' The en banc opinion was seven to four, with Judge
Luttig writing the majority opinion, Judges Wilkinson and
Niemeyer writing concurring opinions, and Judge Motz writing the
dissenting opinion.82 The majority found that the Supreme Court's
Lopez and Boerne opinions were "plainly controlling" and reaffirmed
"the principles of limited federal government upon which this
Nation is founded."' With these principles in mind, the Fourth
Circuit was "constrained to conclude"" that Congress exceeded its
authority under either Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Commerce Clause by passing VAWA.8"
In its analysis of the constitutionality of VAWA,' the Fourth
Circuit first examined whether Congress was within its authority
under the Commerce Clause when enacting VAWA.87 The court
interpreted Lopez as placing outer limits upon congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause."5 The court found that the
Lopez limitations were dispositive and determined that VAWA was
not a constitutional extension of congressional power because it
costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products;
(7) a Federal civil rights action as specified in this section is necessary to
guarantee equal protection of the laws and to reduce the substantial adverse
effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce; and
(8) victims of gender-motivated violence have a right to equal protection of the
laws, including a system ofjustice that is unaffected by bias or discrimination
and that, at every relevant stage, treats such crimes as seriously as other
violence crimes.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29.
78. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 966-69.
79. See id. at 968.
80. See id.
81. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
82. See i&
83. Id. at 826.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. The Fourth Circuit first evaluated whether Brzonkala properly stated a claim for
relief under VAWA pursuant to a 12(bX6) motion. See id. at 829-30. The Court held that
Brzonkala properly stated a claim for relief under VAWA. See id. at 830. Further
discussions of the claims requirements are beyond the scope of this Note.
87. See id. at 829-61.
88. See id.
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went beyond these limits. 9 The Fourth Circuit was also influenced
by the Supreme Court's recent decisions that "jealously[] enforced
the structural limits on congressional power that inhere in Our
Federalism.' 9° Accordingly, the court held that the civil rights
provision of VAWA was unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause because it intruded too heavily into areas reserved to the
states.91
The Fourth Circuit also held that Congress overstepped its
authority granted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
passing VAWA. Heavily influenced by the Supreme Court's
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,92 the Fourth Circuit held that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment by
passing VAWA because VAWA is directed at purely private
conduct.' The en banc court rejected the argument that Section 5
allows Congress to pass prophylactic legislation aimed at purely
private conduct even if Section 1 requires state action.94 The court
found such an understanding of Congress's Section 5 power
inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution and Supreme
Court precedent. 5 Finally, assuming arguendo that VAWA is
directed at state equal protection violations, the court held that
VAWA is vastly out of proportion to its aim in remedying equal
protection violations and therefore is unconstitutional.
The en banc decision is not the end of the story. The Supreme
Court has agreed to review the Brzonkala decision." With the

89. See id. (finding no connection between gender-related violence and interstate
commerce).
90. Id. at 826 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), United States v.
Loper, 514 U.S. 649 (1995), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 146 (1992)).
91. See id. at 829-44.
92. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Supreme Court decided Boerne during the interim between
the panel's decision and the en banc decision in Brzonkala. The Fourth Circuit majority
described Boerne's importance as an intervening precedent:
[Slo crippling to appellants' Section 5 defense of section 13981 is the Court's
intervening decision in City of Boerne, that beth appellants now defend section
13981 primarily under the Commerce Clause, and only secondarily under
Section 5, whereas before the panel of this court, immediately after the Court's
decision in Lopez, they quite understandably defended the statute primarily as
an exercise of Congress' Section 5 authority and only secondarily as an exercise
of Congress' Commerce power ....
Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 881.
93. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 862-73.
94. See id. at 875-81.
95. See id.
96. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5, 99-29).
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constitutionality of VAWA97 and a whole host of other federal
statutes in flux, it is important to consider the constitutional
arguments with renewed vigor. Such is the task of the next part of
this Note.
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF VAWA

The Constitution contains twenty-one clauses specifically
enulherating positive powers to Congress." Even though Congress
99
only needs to have one legitimate power to adopt legislation,
Congress explicitly invoked two of its enumerated powers to pass
VAWA: the commerce power" ° and the power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.'' This part argues that the Supreme
Court should affirm the en banc Fourth Circuit because neither the
Commerce Clause nor Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress the power to adopt legislation like VAWA.
Congress Overstepped Its Commerce ClauseAuthority
Congress's commerce authority is arguably the broadest and
most important of all Congress's powers.'0 2 Indeed, between 1937
97. The circuits are already divided on the constitutionality of VAWA. The Fourth
Circuit sitting en banc held that VAWA is unconstitutional, see Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826,
whereas the Eighth Circuit declined to examine the constitutionality of VAWA. See Doe v.
Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1344 (8th Cir. 1998).
98. Article I of the Constitution contains eighteen clauses that enumerate various powers
to Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Civil War Amendments each provide additional
grants of power to Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,§
5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
99. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH

RESTuPoN THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 177-81(1878).
100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994):
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section
8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the civil
rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety,
health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal
civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
Id.
102. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES 174
(1997) ("Yet, of all these provisions bestowing power on Congress, none is more important
than [the commerce power]."); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.1, at 355-56 (2d ed. 1992) (indicating
that the commerce power, broadly construed, can be seen as the federal equivalent of the
police power and is perhaps the most sweeping of Congress's powers); LAURENCE E. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 305-06 (2d ed. 1988) ("The commerce clause is... the chief
source of congressional regulatory power.").
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and 1995, the Supreme Court did not strike down any piece of
legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 10 3
Notwithstanding the breadth of this power, the Lopez, Court
demonstrated that the Commerce Clause is not a blank check that
04
allows Congress to pass any legislation it deems appropriate.'
This section of the Note focuses on Congress's Commerce Clause
authority as synthesized in the Lopez decision. 0 5 This section
argues that Lopez prevents Congress from enacting non-economic
legislation like VAWA-legislation that only has a "substantial
effect" upon commerce because Congress has "piled inference upon
inference "o°" in its findings. More importantly, this section argues
that the recent federalist trend of the Court indicates that the
Court will exact stricter scrutiny over Commerce Clause legislation
that interferes with a power traditionally reserved to the states.
Under this stricter scrutiny, VAWA clearly fails the constitutional
test because VAWA regulates criminal and domestic relations,
10 7
which are two areas left almost exclusively to the states.

103. See CHEMERUNSKY, supra note 102, at 174.
104. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
105. Although the history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is rich and
important, the Court provided a comprehensive exploration of this history in Lopez. See id.
at 552-61. Moreover, the concurring and dissenting opinions supplement this already
comprehensive examination of the Court's Commerce Clause precedents. See id. at 568-83
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 603-08 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id at 615-18, 625-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Therefore, this Note does not
revisit or explore the history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a treatise or
textbook would, but rather uses the syntheses of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Lopez
as a springboard for its discussion of Congress's commerce power. For some excellent works
focusing on the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see generally PAUL I. BENSON, JR.,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970 (1970); CHEMERINSKY, supra

note 102, at 174-97; FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTruTIoN (1987); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

141-227 (13th ed. 1997); 1 ROTUNDA &NOWAY, supra note 102, at 355-450; TRIBE, supra note
102, at 305-317.
106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
107. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) ('Although the States
surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained 'a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty.'(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 285 (James
Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961))); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,518
(1997) (indicating concerns about congressional intrusion into *spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States" (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)));
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) ("States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law." (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)));
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) ("Our national government is one of
delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice
rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers,
has created offenses against the United States." (citations omitted)).
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Lopez
In 1995, the Supreme Court shocked many lawyers,judges, and
academics because for the first time in sixty years it actually found
that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause.'
Studying the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause

jurisprudence prior to Lopez is like studying a display of unlimited
power. The post-New Deal and pre-Lopez cases demonstrate that
Congress can regulate virtually anything, from a lone wheat farmer
in Ohio" 9 to a small barbecue restaurant in Alabama," 0 in the
name of commerce."' This limitless history was, in part, what the

Court was responding to with Lopez.
The Court held in Lopez that the Gun-Free Schools Zone Act
(GFSZA) of 1990112 was an unconstitutional use of the commerce

power. The Court "start[ed] with first principles"" 3 and examined
the commerce power enumerated to Congress in Article ."4 The
Court then examined its own precedent under the Commerce
Clause."' This examination led the Court to conclude that the

Commerce Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, gives
Congress three broad areas of regulatory power."8 Congress has

the power to regulate (1) "the use of the channels of interstate
commerce;"" 7 (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce;" and (3) "activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce... i.e.,
those
commerce." 119

activities that substantially affect interstate

108. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 675 n.8 (1995) (I'he
5-4 result [in Lopez] defied the predictions of most constitutional scholars and judges.*).
109. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
110. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
111. Indeed, Professor Merritt reflected candidly that "[w]hen [she] graduated from law
school in 1980, [her] classmates and [she] believed that Congress could regulate any act-no
matter how local-under the Commerce Clause." Merritt, supra note 108, at 674; see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 194 (indicating that the commerce power has been very
broad since 1937); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 102, at 394 (maintaining that prior to
Lopez, "the Supreme Court... interpret[ed] the commerce clause as a complete grant of
power").
112. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988).
113. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
114. See id. at 552.
115. See id. at 553-61.
116. See id. at 558.
117. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
118. Id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) and Southern R. Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)).
119. Id. at 558-59 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) and NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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The Court quickly concluded that GFSZA was neither a
regulation of the channels of interstate commerce nor a regulation
of an instrumentality of interstate commerce.'o2 Therefore, the
Court focused solely on whether the GFSZA was a regulation of an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 121 To
determine if possession of guns in school was an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce, the Court examined
three factors.
First, the Court looked to the regulated activity in question to
determine if it was economic in nature. 122 The Court indicated that
if an activity is economic in nature, the Commerce Clause
authorizes Congress to regulate that activity."3 The GFSZA,
however, was not a regulation of an economic activity because,
facially, the statute only criminalized possession of guns in
school.12' Possession of guns, without more, is not an inherently
economic activity. 12 The first factor therefore was not satisfied.
The second factor the Court considered under the "substantial
effects" test is the presence of a "jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession
in question affects interstate commerce." 12' The Court intimated
that if the GFSZA had such a jurisdictional requirement, the Court
may have sustained the statute. 127 This second factor carried no
weight, though, because the GFSZA had no jurisdictional element.
The third factor the Court considered in Lopez was by far the
most important: the nexus the questioned regulation had to
interstate commerce."2 This nexus is determined by a two-prong
120. See id. at 559.

121. See id. at 559-68. When evaluating whether Congress acts within its enumerated
powers by enacting a given piece of legislation, the Court generally applies a deferential

rational basis level of review. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. The Lopez
decision, however, indicated that the Court was no longer willing to extend the traditional
deference given to legislation passed under the Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court

indicated that it was applying a stricter standard of review. See infra notes 189-94 and
accompanying text.

122. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 ("[W]e have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts
regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce.").
123. See id
124. See id. at 561.

125. See id.
126. Id.

127. See id. at 561-62.
128. This factor is not explicitly laid out in the Court's decision. However, after the Court

considered the jurisdictional factor, the Court moved on to examine the burdens that
possession of guns in schools poses upon interstate commerce. The Court did so first by
discussing the absence of congressional findings and then by considering the arguments
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analysis.'29 First, the Court must examine the burden that the
regulated activity has upon interstate commerce.' 30 Secondi the
Court must weigh this burden against the intrusion that the
regulation has into areas traditionally reserved to the states.' 3 ' The
Court found that the GFSZA was an unconstitutional exercise of the
commerce power because the burden that possession of guns in
12
schools has upon interstate commerce is minimal and attenuated,

whereas the intrusion into areas traditionally
reserved to the
3
states, education and criminal law, is great.

Lower courts are now left to wrestle with the meaning ofLopez.
Scholars have suggested two general interpretations of Lopez.
Some ,suggest that Lopez indicates an intention by the Supreme
Court to significantly limit Congress's broad commerce authority.'13

Others suggest that Lopez was simply an aberrational response to
the cavalier manner in which Congress passed the GFSZA.' 35
posited by the government and the dissents as to why possession of guns in schools
substantially affects interstate commerce. See id. at 562-68.
129. The Court also never explicitly developed a two-part analysis, but this is a
reasonable interpretation of the Court's examination of the effects that possession of guns
in schools has upon interstate commerce, contrasted with the burden that regulating the
possession of guns in schools has upon areas traditionally reserved to the states. See id.
Moreover, the Court has, on several occasions, indicated that congressional power under the
Commerce Clause must be balanced against the intrusion into state sovereignty. This is the
"mi[rror image" argument. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
In a case... involving the division of authority between the federal and state
governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is
delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred upon Congress.
Id.; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating that Commerce Clause
and federalism inquiries are really the same because the Tenth Amendment "states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered').
130. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (indicating that the Court is concerned about "the
substantial burdens that an activity has upon interstate commerce").
131. See id. at 564-68 (demonstrating that the Court is concerned about 'limitation[s] on
federal power.., in areas.., where States have historically been sovereign").
132. See id. at 563-68.
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers'."
In Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 762,752 (1995) ("The Supreme Court's
recent decision in United States v. Lopez marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of
the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers."); Richard
A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaithand the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167,167
(1996) (maintaining that Lopez is *the most important Commerce Clause decision since the
civil rights cases of thirty years ago").
135. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Foreword,94 MCH. L. REV. 533, 551-52 (1995) (concluding
that Lopez was a response to "irresponsibility on the part of... Congress" and therefore has
little precedential value); H. Jefferson Powell, EnumeratedMeans and UnlimitedEnds, 94
MICH. L. REV. 651, 652 (1995) ("United States v. Lopez can be read as a fairly mundane
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Under the latter interpretation, as long as Congress demonstrates
the connection a regulation has to interstate commerce through
findings or a jurisdictional requirement, the regulation will be
sustained by future courts notwithstanding Lopez.se By and large,
the lower federal courts have adopted such an interpretation by
calling into doubt1 3 7 or declining to extend Lopez to other federal
statutes. 138
1 1Z
Although Lopez did not explicitly overrule any' prior
precedent,3 9 the decision nevertheless demonstrates that a majority
on the Supreme Court is no longer willing to define the interstate
commerce power as broadly as it had in the past. Instead, the
Supreme Court indicated that it now will place both federalism and
proximate cause-type limitations upon Congress's commerce
disagreement over the application of a long-settled test."); Donald H. Regan, How To Think
About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REv. 554, 554 (1995) ("I do not think Lopez is likely to inaugurate a major change
in the Court's inclination to uphold federal legislation."); Robert Wax, United States v. Lopez:
The ContinuedAmbiguity of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,69 TEMPLE L. REV. 275, 302
(1996) (indicating that the inconsistencies of Lopez and earlier precedent ensures that Lopez
will not have a significant impact).
136. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 30, § 6:16 ("Based solely on the voluminous
support for the explicit Congressional findings connecting gender motivated violence with
interstate commerce, federal courts should easily find that Title I is constitutional under
Lopez.").
137. See United States v. Katz, No. 95-30348, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 24658, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 12, 1997) (declining to extend Lopez to wire fraud statute), afld, 214 F.3d 214
(9th Cir. 1997) (mem.).
138. In 1997 alone, nine circuits rejectedLopez challenges to various federal statutes. See,
e.g., United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Schoolyard
statute of the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. 860 (1994))); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997)
(upholding the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (CSRA) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 228
(1992))); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1030-33 (lst Cir. 1997) (upholding the
CRSA); United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 10-13 (lst Cir. 1997) (upholding statute
criminalizing possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994), and the Youth Handgun
Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1994)); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1386-87
(11th Cir. 1997) (upholding extortion application of the Hobbs Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1951 (1994)); United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 924 (1994), a felon-in-possession criminal statute); United States v. Farrish, 122
F.3d 146, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(1994)); United States
v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343,348-49 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972,33 U.S.C. § 1317 (as amended 1987)); United States v. Henson, 123
F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Schoolyard Act, 21 U.S.C. § 869 (1994), and
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994), a felon-in-possession statute); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d
1488,1496 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (1988), which proscribes transporting
a minor across state lines with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity); United
States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1268-71 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
(1994), a statute criminalizing possession of a machine gun); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d
1338, 1350-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994), a statute criminalizing
gambling).
139. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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authority. These limitations are important because they suggest
that the Supreme Court should affirm the en banc Fourth Circuit
and correctly hold VAWA unconstitutional. VAWA is simply too
remote from interstate commerce and interferes too significantly
with an area traditionally reserved to the states.
Violence Against Women Does Not Have a SubstantialEffect
upon Interstate Commerce
By using the three-factor analysis evident from Lopez, this
section suggests that the en ban Fourth Circuit correctly decided
that VAWA is an unauthorized extension of Congress's commerce
power. To begin with, violence against women is not an activity
that is economic in nature. As mentioned earlier, the Lopez Court
indicated that "[wihere economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained."'
The Lopez Court, however, found that the GFSZA
was criminal in nature and has "nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise."141 Similar to the GFSZA, VAWA
42
facially has nothing to do with economic or commercial activity. 1
Instead, VAWA is more appropriately characterized as a civil rights
statute."4 Therefore, VAWA fails the first factor the Lopez Court
used in its "substantial effect" test.
Additionally, VAWA lacks any interstate jurisdictional
requirement. The Lopez Court indicated that a statute containing
ajurisdictional element that ensures a nexus between the regulated

activity and interstate commerce likely would be sustained as a
constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.'" Yet,
similar to the GFSZA, VAWA lacks an interstate jurisdictional
requirement that requires a case-by-case determination of the
nexus between the activity in question and interstate commerce. 145
Although the Court maintained that such a jurisdictional element
140. Id. at 560.
141. Id. at 661.
142. Commercial activity is used in the normal sense of the term. Commercial activity
refers to "any type of business or activity which is carried on for a profit." BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 1990). Violence against women does not directly relate to any
exchange of goods, services, or property of any kind in the ordinary or plain sense of the
terms. Indeed, Congress itself recognized in its findings that violence against women is not
facially a commercial activity, but only relates to commerce indirectly by deterring women
from fully participating in the economy. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993).
143. Indeed, this is how Congress itself characterized VAWA by calling the provision in

question "Civil Rights for Women." 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
144. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
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is not required," the Court at least hinted that such a
jurisdictional requirement may have helped to sustain the
GFSZA. 147 Just like the GFSZA, VAWA contains no jurisdictional
requirement and accordingly fails the second factor used in Lopez.
The third Lopez factor is by far the most important: the burden
the regulated activity has upon interstate commerce weighed
against the regulation's intrusion into areas traditionally reserved
to the states. 148 To begin with, the burden that violence against
women has upon interstate commerce is minimal and attenuated.
An examination of the findings Congress made relative to the
relationship between violence against women and interstate
commerce reveals this attenuation. 149 Congress found that"gendermotivated violence has a substantial adverse effect upon interstate
commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from
transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate
commerce."1' Additionally, Congress found that "gender-motivated
[crime] has a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
the supply of and the demand for interstate
costs, and 1decreasing
8
products." '
These findings essentially amount to a costs-of-crime
argument. 152 There are two assumptions underlying this argument.
First, crimes motivated by violence are burdensome upon interstate
commerce in that crimes of violence motivated by gender deter
women from consuming goods and services at night and in risky
situations when they otherwise would consume."a Second, crimes
of violence motivated by gender burden national productivity
because such crimes deter women from working at night or at
places where crimes of violence motivated by gender may be more
prevalent. 1 " Simply put, this costs-of-crime argument suggests
that crimes motivated by gender substantially affect interstate
commerce because such crimes deter women from participating
fully in the economy.'
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
161.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 662.
See id.
See supranotes 128-33 and accompanying text.
See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993).
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See i
See ia
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This costs-of-crime reasoning was precisely the reasoning
rejected in Lopez. 1" The Court rejected this costs-of-crime reasoning for two reasons. First, similar to a proximate cause analysis in
torts, 15 7 the Court indicated that it was unwilling to accept the

costs-of-crime argument because the causation link between the
regulated activity and the burden on interstate commerce is just too
remote and attenuated."' 8 Indeed, the Lopez Court struck down the
GFSZA because it was concerned that if it accepted the costs-of-

crime reasoning posited by the government, "it... [would be]
1 59
The Court's
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power."

proximate cause concern is further evidenced by the Court's
recognition that "the question of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause 'is necessarily one of degree."'1 6s Interestingly,
the Court quoted Justice Cardozo 16 ' as an affirmation of this
principle."s2 The GFSZA failed the proximate cause concerns of the
Lopez Court because the costs-of-crime reasoning used to support

the GFSZA would render interstate commerce limitless."6a VAWA
also fails these proximate cause concerns because the costs-of-crime
156. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-68 (1995).
157. See Merritt, supranote 108, at 679. Referring to Lopez, Professor Merritt explains:
The majority's use of'substantial effect7 is more akin to the notion ofproximate
cause in tort law. The Lopez majority meant that the relationship between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce must be strong enough or close
enough to justify federal intervention, just as the concept of proximate cause
means that a defendant's negligence must be closely enough related to the
plaintiff's injury to justify forcing the defendant to bear to the costs of the
injury.
Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW TORTS § 42 (5th ed.
1984)). Prosser and Keeton explain that '[tihe term'proximate cause' is applied by the courts
to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact of
causation is clearly established.' KEETON ET AL., supra, at 273.
158. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-68. Prosser and Keeton explain that the chief concern of
proximate cause is limiting tort liability to only "conduct [that] has been so significant and
important a cause [to plaintiff's injury) that the defendant should be legally responsible."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 157, at 273.

159. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
160. Id. at 566 (quoting NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
161. This is interesting, of course, because Justice Cardozo wrote the majority opinion in
perhaps the most famous proximate cause decision known to American legal culture. See
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
162. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. Justice Cardozo wrote:
"There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction of what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer
rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments
at the center. A society such as ours 'is an elastic medium which transmits all
tremors throughout its territory, the only question is of their size."
Id. (quoting United States v. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)
(Cardozo, J. concurring)).
163. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
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reasoning supporting VAWA, evidenced by the congressional
findings, 16 renders the enumerated interstate commerce power
limitless. After all, if Congress can regulate any violent crime or
domestic violence in the name of commerce, what can it not
regulate?
The second reason that the Court rejected this costs-of-crime
reasoning is actually the second part of the third Lopez factor: the
intrusion that the congressional regulation has into areas traditionally reserved to the states. This is essentially a federalism
concern. 165 The Lopez Court struck down the GFSZA because of its
intrusion into "areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign.""' Such an intrusion is unconstitutional because "[tihe powers delegated by the...16 7
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined"
whereas the powers left to "the State governments are numerous
and indefinite."6 " Like the GFSZA, VAWA regulates areas
traditionally of state concern-criminal conduct and domestic
relations. 1 9 Therefore, VAWA is similarly constitutionally suspect.
The costs-of-crime rationale Congress used to support
VAWA,' 70 when extended, illustrates why VAWAis constitutionally
suspect. Crimes of violence, whether motivated by gender animus
or not, probably deter people from participating fully in the
economy. 17 ' Crimes of violence also are likely to have an adverse
164. See S. REP. No. 301-138, at 37 (1993); see also supranotes 149-55 and accompanying
text.
165. The recent Court has been remarkably active in protecting federalism concerns. See
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643-45 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct.
2240, 2247-54 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2223-24 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)
(striking down provision in 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §
922(s)(2), on Tenth Amendment federalism grounds); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997) (striking down RFRA partly on federalism grounds); United States v. Lopez, 614
U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down GFSZA, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990), partly on
federalism grounds). Several commentators have commented extensively on this new found
activism. See, e.g., John M.A. DiPippa, The Death and Resurrection ofRFRA: Integrating
Lopez and Boerne, 20 U. ARK LrITLE ROCKL.J. 767 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand
the Uses and Limits ofLaw: Printz and PrincipleF,111 HARV. L REV. 2180 (1998); Melvin
R. Faraoni, Note, Printz v. United States: FederalismRevisited or Madison and Hamilton
Are AIt Again, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491 (1998).
166. Lopez, 614 U.S. at 564.
167. Id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961)).
168. Id.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
170. See supra notes 152-55.
171. It seems perfectly reasonable to posit that people generally will be deterred from
consuming goods and services at times or places where they would fear injury or death
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affect on the productivity of the workforce.'
Accepting the costsof-crime rationale used by Congress would convert the enumerated
commerce power to a general police power. It is axiomatic that the
general police power was retained by the states with the adoption
of the Constitution. 7 3 Thus, allowing Congress to use the costs-ofcrime rationale in support of its authority to regulate under the

Commerce Clause turns the Constitution's structural limitations
into dead letter. 7 4

Worse, allowing such a broadening of the

resulting from crimes ofviolence. The higher the violent crime rate, therefore, the less likely
it is that individuals will participate fully in the economy. See, e.g., Derek A. Kurtz, Does the
Violence Against Women Act Do Violence to the Limits of CongressionalPower?, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1047, 1066 (1997) (analyzing both the civil rights remedy and the interstate
domestic violence provisions of VAWA and concluding that the civil rights remedy is a
questionable use of congressional power); Joanna Shapland, PreventingRetailSector Crimes,
19 CRIME & JusT. 263, 272-74 (1995) (recognizing that retailers are financially harmed by
increases in risks associated with violent crime activity rates).
172. If individuals fear going to work at night or at given locations because of the violent
crime rate, then these individuals' productivity will suffer. Moreover, if individuals are
injured or killed, their concomitant absence from work will cause productivity to decline. If
this productivity is aggregated on a national scale, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 12728 (1942), then crimes ofviolence may have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 171, at 1066-67.
173. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). As even the nationalist Chief
Justice John Marshall recognized, it makes little sense to have a Constitution which
expressly enumerates the powers allocated to the federal government if those powers are
interpreted in such a way as to leave no powers to the states. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) ("The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated .... ");
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("The [federal] government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.")
174. It is true that federalism is never expressly mentioned or set out in the unamended
Constitution. Scholars suggest that the founders left such references to federalism out of the
Constitution because there was no perceived need for them. See RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS DESIGN 10-12 (1987). It was obvious to the founders that the
Constitution was a compact of the people who consentedto be governed by the limited powers
enumerated to the federal government by the Constitution. See id.; see alsoTHE FEDERALIST
No. 22, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("The fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE.").
To allow the Court to interpret this power in a limitless way therefore abrogates the consent
of the governed and makes the Constitution no longer legitimate. See BERGER, supra, at 1012. Therefore, the limitations placed upon the federal government in the Constitution
themselves suggest the federalism structure. See id. Moreover, the text of the Tenth
Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. X, when read with the understanding that the creation
of the federal government postdated the creation of the various state governments, see
BERGER, supra,at 21-47, indicates that the Framers of the Constitution intended a federalist
structure with the states retaining most of the governmental powers. See id. at 20.
Suggesting that the Court must enforce federalism limits on Congress's use of power
assumes, of course, that the Court can and should use judicial review to strike down statutes
passed in contravention of these limits. This is certainly a contestable assumption. See
generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175
(1980) (explaining the Federalism Proposal, which states that judicial review is not the
mechanism for remedying federal intrusion into states' rights); Herbert Wechsler, The
PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism-TheRole ofthe States in the Compositionand Selection
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federal government's power will destroy the "healthy balance of
power between the States and Federal Government [and increase]
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."1 5
This third factor-burden on interstate commerce weighed
against the intrusion into states' sovereignty-is probably best
interpreted as a sliding scale. 7 ' The higher the burden a given
activity has on interstate commerce, the more likely the regulation
of that activity will be sustained as a constitutional use of Congress's commerce power. 17 Similarly, the smaller the intrusion a
congressional regulation has into an area retained by the states, the
more likely it is that the regulation will be sustained. In the case
of VAWA, the burden on interstate commerce from crimes of
violence motivated by gender is so minimal and remote and the
intrusion into areas reserved to the states so great that VAWA
simply cannot stand.

of the National Government, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1961).
However, this Note assumes arguendo that such a use of judicial review is appropriate
because a majority of the Court has not hesitated in recent cases to use the power ofjudicial
review to strike down statutes that overstep federalism limits on Congress's power. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (citing Federalist concerns when striking
down a statute as unconstitutional, usingjudicial review); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority in passing RFRA and striking
it down using judicial review); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996)
(using judicial review to strike down a statute the Court held was beyond the scope of
Congress's authority); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (same); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic

& State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 893-96 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (arguing
forcefully that the Court's recent trend of enforcing federalism limits upon congressional
power is not judicial activism).
175. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
176. Although this author is unaware of such a sliding-scale interpretation and the Lopez
Court never discussed such a sliding-scale, the Court nevertheless indicated that its
evaluations of Congress's enumerated powers 'are not precise formulations, and in the
nature of things they cannot be." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. This language, and the practical
effect of the Lopez decision, suggests that the Court itselfconceptualizes the commerce power
in sliding-scale terms. Additionally, the Court's use of proximate cause-type reasoning also
supports this sliding-scale interpretation. See id. at 566-67.
177. This sliding-scale interpretation also is supported by subsequent cases in which the
Court indicated that it was unwilling to uphold congressional action which intruded too far
into an area traditionally reserved to the states or to a power reserved to the states in the
constitutional structure because the problem addressed imposed little burden upon an
interstate interest. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-35 (holding that the Constitution creates a
system of dual sovereignty which prevents Congress from commandeering state officials into
performing the national will); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (holding that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress only remedial powers over state violations of Section
I of the Fourteenth Amendment and not a general plenary power to legislate in areas of life,
liberty, and property traditionally reserved to the states); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from using its Article I powers to
authorize suits by private parties against unconsenting states).
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Response to Civil Rights LegislationArgument
Those in support of VAWA's constitutionality rely on the fact
that VAWA is a civil rights statute. Indeed, on several occasions
the Court has sustained civil rights legislation passed under the
Commerce Clause.1 78 This argument therefore concludes that
VAWA should be sustained.179 The Lopez Court itself, however,
implicitly rejected this argument. The Lopez Court reviewed the
structure and history of the Commerce Clause and established a
framework for analyzing cases arising under it."s In this framework, the Court interpreted its Heart of Atlanta..1 decision as
affirming Congress's power to regulate the "channels of interstate
commerce"' 2 because the statute at issue in that case prevented
discrimination by hotels that operate on the interstate highways
and byways." s Additionally, the Court's decision in Katzenbach v.
McClung' rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act because it regulated instrumentalities in interstate
commerce.' 5 In McClung, the Court sustained the 1964 Civil
Rights Act as a constitutional use of the commerce power as it
applied to Ollie's Barbecue because the restaurant "serv[ed] food,
portion of which has moved in interstate coma substantial
" 186
merce.
VAWA differs significantly from the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
VAWA regulates no instrumentality or thing in interstate commerce. Neither does VAWA regulate the channels of interstate
commerce. Rather, VAWA only gives a private victim a cause of
action against individuals who have committed a crime of violence
motivated by gender animus."8 7 The framework the Lopez Court
used in its Commerce Clause analysis therefore implicitly refutes
this civil rights argument and suggests that the Court is unlikely
to sustain VAWA on that ground.

178. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-06 (1964) (rejecting a Commerce
Clause challenge to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (same).
179. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 30, § 6.1.
180. See supra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
181. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
182. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
183. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241.
184. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
186. See id. at 304.
186. Id
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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Responses to the RationalBasis Argument
Some jurists and commentators point to the fact that the Lopez

Court did not explicitly overrule any prior precedent and accordingly conclude that Lopez simply affirms the rational basis test used

in prior decisions."' 8 Using this rational basis test, the Court
reviews congressional action under the Commerce Clause to
determine whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate com-

merce."8 9 If Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the
regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce,,then
the Court defers to Congress's judgment and sustains the regula-

tion. 90 Following this line of argument, as long as Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that violence against women substantially affects interstate commerce,' 91 courts should defer to that
judgment and sustain VAWA.

This argument is problematic. Although it is true that the
Lopez Court did not overrule any prior precedent, the Court
nevertheless indicated that it was unwilling to extend the deference

previously given to Congress in such a way as to delimit the
Constitution because allowing Congress to regulate crimes moti-

vated by gender opens the door to the federalization of every violent
crime. 9 '

Upholding VAWA would require the Court to extend

188. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 30, § 6:15 ("The collective message from the postLopez jurisprudence is that rational review will continue to be deferential, but not
meaningless.*); Christine Conover, Student Recent Development, The Violence Against
Women Act: Stabilizing Commerce Through a Civil Rights Remedy, 1 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 269, 272 (1997) ('A different interpretation of the legislative findings on gendermotivated violence and of Lopez will show how courts should uphold VAWA under the
Commerce Clause."); Peter J. Liuzzo, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University: The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act-Recognizing that
Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 386-87
(1997) (arguing that VAWA is a constitutional use of Congress's commerce power because
Lopez simply requires a court to examine Congress's findings to determine if Congress could
rationally conclude that violence motivated by gender affects interstate commerce and the
findings suggest that Congress could so rationally conclude).
189. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 165-56 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-304.
190. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 305; HeartofAtlanta, 379 U.S. at 301; McClung, 379 U.S. at
304-05.
191. These commentators argue that Congress's findings, see S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 37
(1993), prove that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that violence against women
substantially affects interstate commerce. See Sunstein et al., supra note 30, § 6:16;
Conover, supra note 188, at 276-78; Liuzzo, aupra note 188, at 391-92.
192. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567 (1995). The Court forcefully concluded
its opinion by writing.
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deference to Congress in such a way as to delimit the Constitution.
"This," the Lopez Court reiterated, "we are unwilling to do." 193 The
Lopez Court found that the substantial effects rationale used to
support the GFSZA, which portends no limits to Congress's
commerce power, is not rational when viewed in the context of the
limited powers enumerated in our constitutional scheme' 94 The
unlimited rationale used to support VAWA is similarly not rational
when viewed through the same process.
VAWA fails constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause
because VAWA fails all three factors used by the Lopez Court in its
"substantial effects" reasoning. VAWA regulates a non-commercial
activity, lacks a jurisdictional requirement, and intrudes too far
into areas reserved to the states while addressing activity that
burdens interstate commerce too remotely.
Congress Overstepped Its FourteenthAmendment Authority
Congress passed VAWA to remedy two equal protection
problems.195 First, Congress passed VAWA to provide private
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender a cause of action
to remedy this harm. 9 " Second, Congress passed VAWA as an
effort to correct states' differential treatment of crimes of violence
motivated by gender. 97 The Constitution does not authorize
Congress to pass VAWA for the first purpose because VAWA
proscribes purely private conduct. The Constitution also does not
authorize Congress to pass VAWA for the second purpose, but for
a different reason. In the second instance, the means used by
Congress in passing VAWA are simply not proportionate to the
end. 9 8 VAWA is therefore an unconstitutional use of Congress's
enforcement power.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have . . . giv[en] great deference to
congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the
possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further.
To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of
powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never
will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.
This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted).
193. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568.
194. See id. at 567-68.
195. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,797 (W.D. Va.
1996).
196. See supra note 77.
197. See id.
198. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 800.
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VAWA Regulates PrivateConduct
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment]."'" Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[41o State shall.., deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. "2" Among other things, the Enforcement Clause gives
Congress the authority to pass any legislation to enforce Section l's
proscription against a state's denial of the equal protection of the
laws.2"' Congress passed VAWA pursuant to this power. 0 2
It is well settled that any violation of the equal protection
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment requires state
action.' 3 In 1883, the Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
200. Id. § 1.
201. Some scholars suggest that Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is broader than both Congress's spending power or commerce power. See Ronald
D. Rotunda, The Powersof Congress UnderSection5 ofthe FourteenthAmendmentAfter City
of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REv. 163, 171 (1998). Congress's power may be broader under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Commerce Clause because Congress
can use its Section 5 power to override the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 168-70.
Moreover, although it cannot pass laws under its commerce power that are not generally
applicable, Congress can do so under its Section 5 power. See id. at 169. In addition,
Congress is not limited to regulating only areas within interstate commerce under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Congress can use its Section 5 power without
having to spend any money, and thus by using its Section 5 power, Congress may be able to
pass legislation that has a great deal of political benefits without having to suffer the political
costs that attach to spending legislation. See ii at 163-69.
202. For the reasons Congress concluded that it had the power to pass VAWA under the
Enforcement Clause, see supra note 77.
203. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,515-16 (1997) (affirming the state action
requirement); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) ("As a general matter the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to 'private conduct abridging
individual rights.'. . . Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area
of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law." (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922,936-37 (1982) and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,722
(1961))); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) ("The Equal Protection Clause'does
not.., add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against
another.'... This has been the view of the Court from the beginning.... It remains the
Court's view today." (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,554-55 (1876))); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment only
applies to state action); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883) (The duty of
protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights was originally assumed
by the States, and it remains there."); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) ("The
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution ... have reference to State
action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals."); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 102, at 212 (maintaining that 'the Court [in the Civil Rights Cases] broadly
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is prohibitory... upon the states.... Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the Amendment. 2 "
This rule that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
extend to private action without any state involvement is still good
law.2" 5 Any legislation passed in an effort to enforce the equal
protection guarantees of Section 1, therefore, must be aimed at
purposeful denials of equal protection caused by government action
or by actors acting under the color of government action. 20e
Because Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies
to activity involving state action, the Section 5 enforcement power
can be used only to regulate purposeful discrimination involving
state action.0 7 VAWA, however, is a regulation which by its terms
applies to purely private conduct.08 VAWA imposes liability upon
...

declared that the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to government action and that
therefore it cannot be used by Congress to regulate private behavior").
204. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-11.
205. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 212-13 ("The Civil Rights Cases remain good
law in implicitly establishing that the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
only to government action, not to private conduct.").
206. Indeed the Court recognized this limitation:
[The last section ofthe [Fourteenth Amendment] invests Congress with power
to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what?... It does not invest
Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of
State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or
State action... It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipallaw
for the regulationof private rights; but to provide modes of redressagainst the
operationof State laws, and the action ofState officers."
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).
207. See id. It is well settled that purposeful discrimination is required for any violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 286 (1979)
(holding that the law needed to reflect a purpose to discriminate); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that "a purpose to
discriminate must be present" (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945))). This
Note assumes without argument that VAWA actually remedies purposeful discrimination.
Whether VAWA actually does so is, however, contestable. VAWA attempts to remedy gender
bias and the differential treatment of crimes of violence motivated by gender in state and
federal courts. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993). State and federal courts' gender biases
and their differential and inadequate treatment of crimes of violence motivated by gender
are certainly troubling, but they are probably not purposeful. Indeed, though Congress made
an impressive array of findings relating to gender bias and inadequate treatment of gendermotivated violent crimes in state and federal courts, nowhere in these findings did Congress
indicate that this discrimination was purposeful. See id.
208. VAWA provides a civil rights cause of action against individuals who commit gendermotivated violent crimes. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). VAWAin no way limits this cause
of action to plaintiffs who are state actors or who are acting under the color of state law. See
id. Thus, a purely private plaintiffmay bring a VAWA cause of action. Additionally, VAWA
does not require a plaintiffto prove that the defendant who committed the gender-motivated
crime of violence was a state actor or had any nexus to state action. See id. Therefore,
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any "person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits
a crime of violence motivated by gender."2 °9 Congress's imposition
of liability to any person "includinga person who acts under color
of any statue, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State"210 indicates that Congress intended to regulate both purely
private conduct and state action. Otherwise, why would Congress
parsimoniously distinguish between purely private individuals and
individuals "who actO under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulations, custom, or usage of any State?"2 ' VAWA therefore is
an unconstitutional use of Congress's enforcement power because
VAWA regulates purely private conduct.
Activity with Nexus to State Action
It may be argued that the Court has long recognized, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, that Congress is not limited to regulating
activity solely involving state action. Indeed, the Court has held on
many occasions that Congress can regulate the activities of private
individuals so long as those individuals are acting under the color
of state law, acting in concert with a state actor, or have some state
authority to act. 12 In Brzonkala, however, neither defendant
Morrison nor Crawford acted in concert or colluded with any state
official to violate Brzonkala's rights.21 Neither did Morrison nor
Crawford have state authority to act as they did." 4 Indeed, the fact
that Virginia Tech punished Morrison for his behavior suggests that
the State took no part in the deprivation of Brzonkala's civil
215
rights.

VAWA allows a purely private plaintiff to sue a purely private defendant and others in

federal court for a civil rights cause of action. Indeed, Christy Brzonkala herselfwas a purely
private plaintiff suing, among others, a purely private defendant (Morrison) under VAWA.

See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 827 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. Id.

212. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,942 (1982) (holding that a plaintiff
could bring suit against a private individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the private
individual used state mechanisms to violate plaintiffs Constitutional due process rights).
213. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,781-82 (W.D.
Va. 1996).
214. See id,
215. See id. at 782.
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The only arguable state action involved in VAWA is actually
state inaction. 216 Essentially, this argument suggests that because
the states have been inadequate in preventing and prosecuting
crimes of violence motivated by gender animus,2 17 the states are
complicit in the violation of equal protection rights and are
therefore causing harm by not acting. Yet, the Court expressly has
rejected this complicity-is-action argument.2 16 Moreover, the Court
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 21 9 held that, in order to be considered state action, a private party's actions must be "fairly attributable to the State."2 20 In Lugar, the Court held that the joint participation between a private actor and the state courts 221 was enough
to make the private party's actions fairly attributable to the
State.2 22 In Brzonkala's case, though, there is no use of state procedures or joint action with a state actor. Morrison and Crawford
216. It may be argued that Congress passed VAWA to attack ineffective state remedies
for victims of violence motivated by gender. Indeed, this is the argument that Congress itself
articulated in support of its use of Section 5 power. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993)
("State and Federal criminal laws do not... adequately provide victims of gender-motivated
crimes the opportunity to vindicate their interests."). This argument relies on cases like
United States v. Guest and Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the court found that direct state
action was not required. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756-57 (1966) (holding
that allegations of private individuals' use of the state police and judiciary was enough to
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment and prevent dismissal of the claim); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1948) (holding that state court's enforcement of racial covenant
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In both of those cases,
however, some specific state action existed, it just was not direct. In Guest, the state action
was the action of the state police and judiciary that facilitated the racially discriminatory
conduct of private individuals. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 746-47. In Shelley, the state action
was the action of the court in enforcing a racially restrictive covenant. See Shelley, 334 U.S.
at 19. By contiast, VAWA allows a civil rights remedy because states are not acting at all,
not because they are indirectly acting in a way to deprive individuals of their rights secured
by the Equal Protection Clause.
217. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 ("State and Federal criminal laws do not adequately
protect against the bias element of gender-motivated crimes, which separates these crimes
from acts of random violence, nor do those laws adequately provide victims of gendermotivated crimes the opportunity to vindicate their interests.")
218. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978), in which the Court wrote
that:
This Court... has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private
action converts that action into that of the State.... [Certain] cases clearly
rejected the notion that our prior cases permitted the imposition of Fourteenth
Amendment restraints on private action by the simple device of characterizing
the State's inaction as "authorization" or "encouragement."
Id. (citations omitted).
219. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
220. Id. at 937.
221. See id. at 941-42 (holding that the use of prejudgment attachment procedures offered
by the state courts was enough to make a private party liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983's state
action requirement).
222. See id.
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acted individually and contrary to the laws of the State and the
University.23 The State acted in no affirmative or negative way to
deprive Brzonkala of her rights.22 ' If the State or some state official
had been involved, then Brzonkala likely would have a valid claim
under other civil rights statutes.25 Morrison and Crawford's
actions therefore are not fairly attributable to the State, and the
state action requirement is not satisfied.
BroadInterpretationof Section 5
Many commentators suggest that VAWA is a constitutional
exercise of Congress's enforcement power because, whereas Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to state action, Section
5 is broader in that it allows Congress to remedy or prevent equal
protection violations.226 VAWA's purpose is to remedy states'
differential treatment of victims of crimes motivated by gender and
to ensure equal treatment of these victims in the future.2 2 7
Therefore, these commentators contend, VAWA is a constitutional
exercise of the enforcement power because Congress is remedying
and preventing equal protection violations.2 These commentators
point to the Court's opinions in United States v. Guest229 and
Katzenbach v. Morgan23 in support of the contention that the
enforcement power allows Congress to regulate private conduct,
notwithstanding Section 1's state action limitation.231
223. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 797 (W.D. Va.

1996).
224. See id.

225. See Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
226. See, e.g., 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAI, supra note 102, at 525-26; Danielle M. Houck, Note,
VAWA After Lopez: ReconsideringCongressionalPower Under the FourteenthAmendment
in Light of Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
625, 637-41 (1998); Chris A. Rauschl, Note, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University: ViolenceAgainst Women, Commerce,and the FourteenthAmendment-Defining
ConstitutionalLimits, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1601,1633-39 (1997). Seegenerally R.J. HARRIS, THE
QUEST FOR EQUALITY 33-56 (1960) (arguing that the legislative history of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that Congress intended Section 5 to be a broad grant of
power); Laurent B. Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Against PrivateActs, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1965) (arguing that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought that Section 5 would give them the power to reach private
discrimination).
227. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993).
228. See Houck, supra note 226, at 637-41; Rauschl, supra note 226, at 1633-39.
229. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
230. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
231. See Houck, supra note 226, at 637-41; Rauschl, supra note 226, at 1633-39; see also
1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 102, § 19.2, at 525-29 (indicating that the Guest and
Morgan decisions interpreted Section 5 broadly enough to include regulation of private
action).
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Relying on Guest and Morgan is dubitable for two reasons.
First, the language in Guest and Morgan used to support this
broadening of power is dictum. 2 Such dictum, of course, cannot be
relied upon because it was not essential to the Court's decision.
Second, and more importantly, subsequent decisions by the Court

call into question the idea that Congress can regulate private
activity under the enforcement power. In Oregon v. Mitchell,233 the
Court scaled back the broad reasoning of Morgan.23'" The Mitchell
Court signaled that it was unwilling to let Congress use the Section
5 enforcement power as a way to expand the limited powers

enumerated to Congress in Article 1.235

Whatever doubt was left about whether the enforcement power
allows Congress to regulate private conduct was answered

definitively by the Court in its 1997 opinion in City of Boerne v.
Flores." The Fores Court wrote that, "[t]here is language in our

opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan which could be interpreted as
acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that
expands the rights contained in [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or

even the best one." 37 Indeed, Flores seriously refutes the
proposition that Section 5 can be used to regulate private
conduct. s8 Fores prompted one prominent scholar to recognize
that "[olne important implication of [Flores] is that it puts even
more seriously in question Congress's power under Section 5 to

regulate private conduct, including private acts of religious, racial
or sex discrimination."39 The Fores Court, therefore, left little
232. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650 (construing Section 6 to grant Congress "the same broad
powers expressed in the necessary and proper clause" in a way that was not necessary to
decide the case); Guest, 383 U.S. at 755 (refusing to reach the question as to what other kinds
ofbroader legislation Congress could pass under Section 5); 1 ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supranote
102, § 19.2, at 526-28.
233. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
234. See id. at 112, 118, 124-31 (striking down a section of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 because Congress used Section 5 as a backdoor way to amend the
Constitution without the cumbersome Article II amendment process); see also 1 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 102, at 531 ("Although the fragmented Morgan] Court does not provide
a precise guide to the proper limitations, a majority did reject the contention that section 5
authorizes Congress to define the substantive boundaries of the equal protection clause by
invalidating state legislation.").
235. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 112, 118, 124-31.
236. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
237. Id. at 527-28 (citations omitted).
238. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWA, supra note 102, at supp. 154-55; Stephen Gardbaum, The
FederalismImplications of Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 678-80 (1998).
239. Gardbaum, supra note 238, at 679 (emphasis added). Gardbaum further recognizes
that the power to regulate private conduct
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doubt that the enforcement power does not authorize Congress to
regulate purely private conduct in the name of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even though Congress acted with good intentions in
trying to provide victims of gender-motivated violence a cause of
action, VAWA is an unconstitutional extension of Congress's
enforcement power because it regulates only purely private conduct.
Yet Congress passed VAWA for another important equal
protection goal: to remedy the differential treatment of crimes of
violence motivated by gender by the various states' criminal justice
systems.2" Although this remedial purpose clearly meets the state
action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, VAWA is not
proportionate to this remedial purpose." VAWA is therefore an
unconstitutional use of Congress's enforcement power.
ProportionalityTest
The Supreme Court has long recognized that Section 5
authorizes Congress to pass legislation remedying differential
treatment.2"2 Accordingly, one may think that VAWA is a
constitutional use of Congress's enforcement power if it remedies
the differential treatment given to violence motivated by gender.24
The problem with VAWA as a remedy to the differential treatment
afforded by states is not the object, but the means used. The means
used by Congress, VAWA, is so out of proportion to the object of the
legislation that it cannot be sustained under Section 5.
The Court recently established a proportionality test to
evaluate constitutional action under Section 5.2 Under this test,
"[tihere must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
was originally denied to Congress in the Civil Rights Cases, but this holding
was generally thought to have been superseded in modern times. Moreover,
combined with what may be closer judicial scrutiny of its commerce powers in
light of United States v. Lopez, Congress's overall power to regulate private
conduct is perhaps less now than at any time since '1937.
Id. at 679 n.60 (citations omitted).
240. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 29 (1993).
241. See infra notes 245-70 and accompanying text.
242. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (MThe remedial and
preventative nature of Congress's enforcement power, and the limitation inherent in the
power, were confirmed in our earliest cases on the Fourteenth Amendment.' (citing The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883))).
243. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29.
244. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 520; see also Gardbaum, supra note 244, at 677 ("Flores
introduced a proportionality test between Congress's chosen means and the constitutional
violation to be remedied or prevented.").
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end."245 The Flores Court then used this test to strike down the
Religious Freedom Reconstruction Act' (RFRA) because "RFRA
[was] so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive
object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior."2

47

RFRA-the means-was so

out .of proportion to the supposed remedial or preventive
object-burdening the free exercise of religion-that the Court was
unwilling to sustain RFRA as a constitutional use of the
enforcement power.2'8
VAWA also fails this proportionality test. The object of
VAWA-remedying and preventing the differential treatment of
crimes ofviolence motivated by gender-is a constitutional object.2 9
The means used, however, are not congruent with the object
because the civil rights provision of VAWA provides no remedy to
the deficiencies in the state systems.50 VAWA only allows a victim
of a crime of violence motivated by gender to have a civil rights
cause of action.2 5 ' VAWA does not correct the current equal
protection deficiencies; instead, VAWA allows a victim to use that
deficient system in a different cause of action than those already
provided by state law.25 2
245. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Reconstruction Act in 1993 (RFRA) in response to the Court's unpopular decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that neutral, generally
applicable laws are applicable to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling
state interest. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. In passing RFRA, Congress sought to statutorily
reverse the Court and require that states have a compelling interest before burdening
religious practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
247. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
248. See id.
249. The Equal Protection Clause prevents states from treating similarly situated
individuals differently. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 102, § 18.8, at 87-102.
250. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,800 (W.D. Va.
1996). The District Court reasoned effectively that VAWA does not remedy the current
deficiencies because:
The statute is overbroad: many women who do not suffer Fourteenth
Amendment violations at the hands of the state system would still have a
VAWA claim. A woman in a state with fair rape laws who is raped and whose
rapist receives the maximum sentence may still have a VAWA claim. That
woman may receive compensation via VAWA despite having suffered no denial
of her equal protection rights. VAWA is also too narrow: many women who
suffer clear violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights would not have
a VAWA remedy, because the crime was not based on the woman's gender.
These women would not receive any compensation despite the fact that the
states clearly denied them equal protection of the laws.

Id.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.

2000]

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT

483

VAWA is both too broad and too narrow. 2" VAWA is too broad
because it allows any victim of a gender-motivated crime of violence
to sue for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, regardless of whether
any state action was involved. 2 ' VAWA is too narrow because a
person may suffer a Fourteenth Amendment violation by being
victimized by a crime of violence motivated by her membership in
a suspect classification that has nothing to do with gender.255 Thus,
because VAWA is too broad and too narrow, it does not remedy. the
problems cited by Congress. 2" VAWA therefore cannot be sustained under the state differential treatment remedy theory.
Simply put, VAWA is "so out of proportion to [the] supposed
preventive or remedial object that it cannot be understood as
257
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."
It may be argued that, unlike RFRA, VAWA is proportionate to
Congress's legitimate ends and is therefore a constitutional use of
the enforcement power. 2 " This argument suggests that remedying
current biases against women who are victims ofviolence motivated
by gender is a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment goal. 2 9 This
argument further suggests that VAWA is proportionate to that goal
and that "VAWA displaces no state law."2s' Therefore, this
argument goes, VAWA is consistent with the constitutional text and
design.
Although this argument at first may look seductive, the
argument's conclusion relies on a premise which may not be true.
That is, this argument unjustifiably discounts VAWA's intrusiveness into areas of state control.2 "1 VAWA regulates intrastate
criminal conduct;21 2 even though only states have the general police
power to regulate for the health, safety, and morals of its citizens.2"
Thus, Congress has entered into areas of regulation that the
Framers themselves intended to be left to the states.264 This
253. See supra note 250.

254. See id.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See id.
See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
See Sunstein et al., supra note 30, §§ 6-36.2, 6-36.3 ("VAWA suffers neither of the

defects identified by the Court in Flores: the legislative record leaves no doubt that the
VAWA was enacted for a purpose within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
remedy chosen is entirely nonintrusive.").
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See id. § 6-36.3.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.

264. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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intrusion into spheres of state control sets a precedent for further
intrusion via the Fourteenth Amendment into areas of state control.

This;precedent would turn the enforcement power of the Fourteenth
Amendment into a general federal plenary power, and this kind of
nationalistic expansion is precisely what the current Supreme
Court has rejected in several recent cases. 2 " Moreover, such a
precedent for national intrusion threatens the merging of."[t]his
separation of the two spheres,"2 " and therefore threatens the
"Constitution's structural protections of liberty."2 "7
The enforcement power does not authorize Congress to regulate

purely private conduct in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The, enforcement power also does not authorize Congress to pass
legislation when the constitutionally appropriate object, of such
legislation is incongruent with the means used. VAWA contravenes
both of these limits. VAWA is therefore not a constitutional use of
Congress's enforcement power.
NORMATIE PRINcIPLEs AND VAWA
Of all the aspects of political science and political theory used

by the Framers when drafting the Constitution, federalism was the
most important and unique.'

It makes sense that these Framers

would, accordingly, draft various provisions of the Constitution to
reflect this uniquely American idea.2 9 The Framers did so for good
reason. They feared tyrannical government because of their bitter
265. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (ensuring that state
governments will represent and remain accountable to their citizens); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
exceeded Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Brechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,635 (1993) (ensuring
that state governments will represent and remain accountable to their citizens); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (discussing federal intrusions into state criminal trials).
266. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.
267. Id.
268. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-76 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLc, 1776-1787, at 524-32, 564

(1969); Henry J. Friendly, Federulism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1019-23 (1977).
269. See U.S. CONST. art. I (enumerating limited powers to the federal government in
order to leave the rest to the states); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (giving the powers to
designate the time, manner, and place for holding elections to the states); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 6 (prohibiting any preference for the "[plorts of one State over those of another");
U.S. CONST. art. IV (preventing states from intruding upon or discriminating against each
other); U.S. CONST. art. VII (requiring the consent of at least nine states in order to ratify the
Constitution); U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving all rights and powers to the states which are
not already limited in the Constitution or enumerated to the federal government).
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experiences under British rule.'" ° Moreover, the Framers realized
that a legitimate democracy requires consent of the governed,7 1 and
this consent is best secured by making the government as close to
the people as possible and by ensuring robust participation in the
political system.272
The normative principles on which the Framers built this
constitutional system are equally important today. This part
examines the normative principles of liberty, fidelity, and efficiency
and suggests that these values are best served by the federalist
government that the Framers created. Through the prism of these
normative principles, this section demonstrates why Congress
should not have the power to pass legislation like VAWA. This part
concludes that allowing Congress to pass legislation like VAWA
destroys the federal balance necessary to protect liberty, to
maintain fidelity to the social contract secured by the Constitution,
and to have efficient governance.
ProtectsIndividual Liberty
Though today's modern world certainly differs from the world
of the Framers, very good reasons still exist for maintaining a
strong commitment to federalism. To begin with, federalism
enhances freedom by providing a double layer of protection against
tyranny.27 3 Maintaining two equally-balanced systems of govern,ment ensures greater protection for individual liberties because
"Ithedifferent governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself."27 ' This double layer of'

270. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L.Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powersor SeparationofPersonnel?,79 CORNELLL. REV. 1045,1141 (1994); Donald Elfenbein,
The Myth of Conseruatismas a ConstitutionalPhilosophy, 71 IOWA L. REv. 401, 483 (1986);
A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEw EuR. L.REv. 143, 143-44 (1993)
available in Westlaw 1 NEWURLR 143; Bruce Stein, The Framers'Intent and the Early
Years of the Republic, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 425 (1982).

271. See infra notes 283-85; see also Marci Hamilton, The People: The LeastAccountable
Branch, 4 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNIDTABLE 1, 7 (1997) (discussing the Framers' preference for

representative government over direct democracy); Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution
as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1129 (1995) (examinin originalism" as the intent of those
who ratified the Constitution).
272. See Rubenfeld, supra note 271, at 1152. See generally Roger Pilon, Freedom,
Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering Our Founding Principles,68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 507 (1993) (emphasizing modern policy governance as at odds with the

founding principles of the Constitution).
273. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576; THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 356-57.
274. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 357.
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protection only works when both sides of the balance-state and
federal-have enough power to prevent "abuse from either front."27
Congress should not have the power to pass legislation like
VAWA because it upsets this federalist balance. When Congress
regulates in areas traditionally belonging to the state-areas such
as criminaljustice 27 -then the federalist balance begins to tip from
the state side to the federal side of the scale. Although just
allowing Congress to creep into the states' territory with VAWA will
not likely upset this balance, the current movement to find national
solutions to all kinds of problems previously left to the states 277 may
severely upset the federalist balance. 2" The Court should reject
this nationalist creep, evidenced by the passage of VAWA, because
this reallocation of power from the states to the federal government
will result
in the states not having enough power to prevent
9
abuse.

27

275. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991).
276. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
277. See Youth Handgun Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1994); Schoolyard Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 860 (1994); National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1996); Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong., 1st Seas. (1999); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997,
H.R. 1122, 105th Cong., lt Seas. (1997); Safe and Affordable Schools Act of 1997, 105th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1997); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat.
3384 (1992); Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (1992);
see also William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute (May 11, 1998), in 75 A.L.I. PROC. 55, 58 (1999) (arguing that "a series of laws
passed by Congress... have expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts," of which VAWA is
one of"the more notable examples," which has raised the "prospect that our system will look

more and more like the French government, where even the most minor details are ordained
by the national government").
278. See William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the FederalJudiciary,THE
THIRD
BRANCH,
Jan.
1999
(visited
Apr.
8,
2000)
<http'J/www.uscourts.gov/tth/jan99tthjanuary1999.html> ("The trend to federalize crimes
that traditionally have been handled in state courts not only is taxing the Judiciary's
resources and affecting its budget needs, but it also threatens to change entirely the nature
of our federal system.").
279. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (ensuring that state
governments will represent and remain accountable to their citizens); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
exceeded Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
576-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the balance between national and
state power is entrusted to the political process); Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458-59 (discussing
federalism's checks on abuses of government power); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supranote 1,
at 357.
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Fidelity and the Social Contract
A second reason for maintaining a strong commitment to
federalism is that the governed consented to a balanced federalist
system. The Framers, influenced by the contractarian idea of

government,2 ° understood the Constitution as a social contract or
compact amongst the states.28 1 The drafters intended this social
28 2
contract to be binding upon future generations unless breached.
Moreover, this social contract could be changed (amended) as long

as enough of the parties to the contract consented to the change. 28
A material term of the contract was that the states and federal

government would exist as co-equal sovereigns balanced in a
federalist system. 8 ' Alexander Hamilton himself recognized that
this federalist balance was essential to the consent of the

governed.2 5
Because the federal balance is a material part of the contract,
a destruction of the federalist balance constitutes material breach.
Put another way, if the federal government usurps powers left to

the states or if the states usurp powers left to the federal government without amending the original contract,2s then the federalist
280. The contractarian form of government is a conception that government was formed
when humans (men for the philosophers cited) collaborated under a "social contract" for
whatever reason and consented to a civil government. See generally THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1651); JOHN LOcKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); David
Hume, The OriginalContract,in SOCIAL CONTRACT 145 (Sir Ernest Barker ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1974); Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra, at
167.
281. See THE FEDERALISTNo. 39, at 283 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961) (arguing that the mutual assent of the states was necessary to the formation of the

union).
282. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding,LegalRealism,and the Interpretation
of 'This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1192 (1987); Ernest Young, Rediscovering
Conservatism: Burkean PoliticalTheory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C. L. REV.
619, 671 n.259 (1994).
283. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing for an amendment process).
284. Indeed this idea is reflected in the four corners of the Constitution. See supranote
272. Moreover, scholars suggest that explicit references to federalism or a federalist balance
were left out of the four corners of the document because the Framers thought the balance
so obvious that inclusion was unnecessary. See supra note 174.
285. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 174, at 198-99.
286. Some may argue that the adoption of the Civil Rights Amendments already usurped
the federalist balance created by the Framers. To an extent, this is true. However, the
parties bound by the contract--the people-ratified the changes made to the federalist
balance through the contractually-provided Article V amendment process. Therefore, the
adoption of these amendments, although upsetting the original federalist balance, does not

call the legitimacy of the social contract into question because the parties "agreed" to the
changes.
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balance provision of the social contract has been breached. Just
like a regular contract, a material breach of the social contract
means that the contract is no longer binding upon the parties." 7
Thus, if the federal government upsets the federal balance by
passing legislation which infringes upon areas of state control, the
binding nature of the social contract is called into question. This
means that no party to the social contract-the Constitution-is
obligated to follow the Constitution and that the very core of our
civil society is up for grabs.
The important question in this social contract framework is
how much of a disruption of the federalist balance is needed to
consider the breach of the social contract material. Passing VAWA
alone is not enough. Yet the current trend of finding national
solutions for problems that previously were left to the states28 ' is
alarming for the very reason that, when viewed together, all of
these national solutions may be enough to constitute a material
breach of the social contract because the national-power side of the
scale has more weight than the state-power side. When this
material breach happens, the very legitimacy of our civil government is affected. Congress therefore should not have the authority
to pass VAWA because it takes our society further down the road to
materially breaching the social contract called the Constitution.
Efficiency, Externalities,and Federalism
A third reason for maintaining a strong federalist balance
sounds in economic analysis-specifically externalities.2 9 Professor
Dukeminier explains:
Externalities exist whenever some person, say X, makes a
decision about how to use the resources without taking full
account of the effects of the decision. X ignores some of the
effects-some of the costs or benefits that would result from a
particular activity, for example-because they fall on others.
They are "external" to X, hence the label externalities.'
287. See supranote 282.
288. See supranote 279.
289. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 83-85 (1995); Thomas S. Ulen,
Economic and Public-ChoiceForces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 921, 927-29
(1998).
290. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KIUER, PROPERTY 49 (3d ed. 1993). The principle of
externalities is an important concept in the economic analysis of the law school of thought.
For more information on externalities and economic analysis of the law in general, see
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988); WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND

ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1979); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND
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This theory suggests that the self-sovereign states originally ceded
power to the federal government in order to minimize the social
costs of negative externalities and maximize the social benefits of
positive externalities. 29 ' According to this theory, the proper role of
the sovereigns-the states and the federal-should be determined
by evaluating which sovereign is in the best position to internalize
and thereby minimize the costs of negative externalities. 92 If a
particular activity negatively affects more than one state, such as
pollution of a river that flows from state-to-state, then the federal
government is the better sovereign to solve the problem because the
states lying upstream will have little or no incentive to act (the
pollution does not stay in their state) whereas the states downstream will not be able to act effectively because of the large
transaction costs.2 93 When the state is forced to take account of all
the burdens of a given activity by internalizing these externalities
(e.g. intrastate crime), however then the state is the better sovereign to solve the problem.29 '
This economic theory suggests that VAWA is an inappropriate
action for the federal government to take. The social costs of crimes
of violence motivated by gender are suffered by the states. These
social costs include victimized citizens, fear of crime and public
safety, increased demand for stronger law enforcement, and more
litigation. Congress, however, has taken it upon itself to pass
VAWA in order to solve these burdens suffered by the states
without having to take "full account of the effects of [its]
decision." 295 This is inefficient because "the costs and the benefits
are not fully realized by the same group."2 In the federalism
context, Congress should not have the power to enact legislation
like VAWA because it allows the states to ignore the burdens that
intrastate crimes of violence motivated by gender impose while
receiving the benefits from the federal legislation. The states,
ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE (1990); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw (5th ed. 1998).
291. See SHAPIRO, supra note 289, at 83-85; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82
MINN. L. REV. 317,407-08 (1997) (examining externalities in the context of the environment);

Ulen, supra note 289, at 925-27 (analyzing the benefits of a federal structure of government).
292. See SHAPIRO, supra note 289, at 83; Ulen, supranote 289, at 928-29.
293. See SHAPIRO, supra note 289, at 83; Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL. REV. 23,29-30 (1996); Ulen, supra note 289, at 92829.
294. See SHAPIRO, supra note 289, at 83-84; Ulen, supra note 289, at 929.
295. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, aupranote 290, at 49.
296. SHAPIRO, supra note 289, at 83.
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therefore, do not internalize the externalities created by crimes of
violence motivated by gender. This makes the states less accountable 'and responsible for their own problems and encourages states
to rely on the federal government for solutions rather than taking
care of the problem themselves.
Whatever the state of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
relative to whether VAWA is an unauthorized congressional action,
Congress should not have the power to pass regulations like VAWA
which aim at purely intrastate activity. Such intrusive federal
power threatens to upset the important federalist balance necessary
for good governance. Upsetting this federal balance threatens
individual liberty by giving the federal sovereign too much power
and the states too little power. The states are thus unable to
prevent abuse by the federal government.297 Upsetting this federal
balance also breaches the social contract entered into with the
ratification of the Constitution. Breaching this social contract is
troubling because it calls the very legitimacy of our governing
system in question. Finally, the economic analysis theory of
federal-state power suggests that the federal government should
not have the authority to regulate with legislation like VAWA
because it prevents the states from internalizing the externalities
involved with the regulated activity. Congress therefore should not
have the power to enact VAWA.
CONCLUSION

Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act for good
reason. Violence against women certainly occurs too often and has
too many terrifying consequences for any responsible government
not to take action in order to minimize the impacts of such activity.
The civil rights provision of VAWA is simply the wrong solution.
VAWA is the wrong solution for two reasons. First, Congress
does not have the authority to pass VAWA. The Commerce Clause,
although broad, does not authorize Congress to regulate activity
that has a minimal burden upon interstate commerce and that
intrudes too far into areas reserved to the states. Moreover, Section
297. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (ensuring that state
governments will represent and remain accountable to their citizens); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
exceeded Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
576-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the balance between national and
state power is entrusted to the political process); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59
(1991) (discussing federalism's checks on abuses of government power); THE FEDERALISTNO.
51, supra note 1, at 357.
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5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to
enact legislation like VAWA because VAWA regulates purely
private conduct and because the means used are not proportionate
to the end. Second, VAWA is the wrong solution because it upsets
the federalist balance necessary for good governance. A society that
cherishes individual liberty and limited government should not
allow Congress to pass legislation like VAWA because the "double
security... to the rights of the people"298 will be threatened by
unbalancing our federalist system.
TROY ROBERT RACKHAm

298. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supranote 1, at 357.

